From 980065ab23650452c33bb47ef66d75fbfbcb6e04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Bartels Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2022 09:32:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Make sentinel value configurable There are OSs that always return the lowest free value. The algorithm in `lazy_init` always avoids keys with the sentinel value. In affected OSs, this means that each call to `lazy_init` will always request two keys from the OS and returns/frees the first one (with sentinel value) immediately afterwards. By making the sentinel value configurable, affected OSs can use a different value than zero to prevent this performance issue. --- .../std/src/sys_common/thread_local_key.rs | 25 +++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/std/src/sys_common/thread_local_key.rs b/library/std/src/sys_common/thread_local_key.rs index 747579f1781..2672a2a75b0 100644 --- a/library/std/src/sys_common/thread_local_key.rs +++ b/library/std/src/sys_common/thread_local_key.rs @@ -117,10 +117,14 @@ pub struct Key { /// This value specifies no destructor by default. pub const INIT: StaticKey = StaticKey::new(None); +// Define a sentinel value that is unlikely to be returned +// as a TLS key (but it may be returned). +const KEY_SENTVAL: usize = 0; + impl StaticKey { #[rustc_const_unstable(feature = "thread_local_internals", issue = "none")] pub const fn new(dtor: Option) -> StaticKey { - StaticKey { key: atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0), dtor } + StaticKey { key: atomic::AtomicUsize::new(KEY_SENTVAL), dtor } } /// Gets the value associated with this TLS key @@ -144,31 +148,36 @@ pub unsafe fn set(&self, val: *mut u8) { #[inline] unsafe fn key(&self) -> imp::Key { match self.key.load(Ordering::Relaxed) { - 0 => self.lazy_init() as imp::Key, + KEY_SENTVAL => self.lazy_init() as imp::Key, n => n as imp::Key, } } unsafe fn lazy_init(&self) -> usize { - // POSIX allows the key created here to be 0, but the compare_exchange - // below relies on using 0 as a sentinel value to check who won the + // POSIX allows the key created here to be KEY_SENTVAL, but the compare_exchange + // below relies on using KEY_SENTVAL as a sentinel value to check who won the // race to set the shared TLS key. As far as I know, there is no // guaranteed value that cannot be returned as a posix_key_create key, // so there is no value we can initialize the inner key with to // prove that it has not yet been set. As such, we'll continue using a - // value of 0, but with some gyrations to make sure we have a non-0 + // value of KEY_SENTVAL, but with some gyrations to make sure we have a non-KEY_SENTVAL // value returned from the creation routine. // FIXME: this is clearly a hack, and should be cleaned up. let key1 = imp::create(self.dtor); - let key = if key1 != 0 { + let key = if key1 as usize != KEY_SENTVAL { key1 } else { let key2 = imp::create(self.dtor); imp::destroy(key1); key2 }; - rtassert!(key != 0); - match self.key.compare_exchange(0, key as usize, Ordering::SeqCst, Ordering::SeqCst) { + rtassert!(key as usize != KEY_SENTVAL); + match self.key.compare_exchange( + KEY_SENTVAL, + key as usize, + Ordering::SeqCst, + Ordering::SeqCst, + ) { // The CAS succeeded, so we've created the actual key Ok(_) => key as usize, // If someone beat us to the punch, use their key instead -- 2.44.0