1 //! An implementation of the [SPAKE2][1] password-authenticated key-exchange
4 //! This library implements the SPAKE2 password-authenticated key exchange
5 //! ("PAKE") algorithm. This allows two parties, who share a weak password, to
6 //! safely derive a strong shared secret (and therefore build an
7 //! encrypted+authenticated channel).
9 //! A passive attacker who eavesdrops on the connection learns no information
10 //! about the password or the generated secret. An active attacker
11 //! (man-in-the-middle) gets exactly one guess at the password, and unless they
12 //! get it right, they learn no information about the password or the generated
13 //! secret. Each execution of the protocol enables one guess. The use of a weak
14 //! password is made safer by the rate-limiting of guesses: no off-line
15 //! dictionary attack is available to the network-level attacker, and the
16 //! protocol does not depend upon having previously-established confidentiality
17 //! of the network (unlike e.g. sending a plaintext password over TLS).
19 //! The protocol requires the exchange of one pair of messages, so only one round
20 //! trip is necessary to establish the session key. If key-confirmation is
21 //! necessary, that will require a second round trip.
23 //! All messages are bytestrings. For the default security level (using the
24 //! Ed25519 elliptic curve, roughly equivalent to an 128-bit symmetric key), the
25 //! message is 33 bytes long.
27 //! This implementation is generic over a `Group`, which defines the cyclic
28 //! group to use, the functions which convert group elements and scalars to
29 //! and from bytestrings, and the three distinctive group elements used in
30 //! the blinding process. Only one such Group is implemented, named
31 //! `Ed25519Group`, which provides fast operations and high security, and is
32 //! compatible with my [python
33 //! implementation](https://github.com/warner/python-spake2).
35 //! # What Is It Good For?
37 //! PAKE can be used in a pairing protocol, like the initial version of Firefox
38 //! Sync (the one with J-PAKE), to introduce one device to another and help them
39 //! share secrets. In this mode, one device creates a random code, the user
40 //! copies that code to the second device, then both devices use the code as a
41 //! one-time password and run the PAKE protocol. Once both devices have a shared
42 //! strong key, they can exchange other secrets safely.
44 //! PAKE can also be used (carefully) in a login protocol, where SRP is perhaps
45 //! the best-known approach. Traditional non-PAKE login consists of sending a
46 //! plaintext password through a TLS-encrypted channel, to a server which then
47 //! checks it (by hashing/stretching and comparing against a stored verifier). In
48 //! a PAKE login, both sides put the password into their PAKE protocol, and then
49 //! confirm that their generated key is the same. This nominally does not require
50 //! the initial TLS-protected channel. However note that it requires other,
51 //! deeper design considerations (the PAKE protocol must be bound to whatever
52 //! protected channel you end up using, else the attacker can wait for PAKE to
53 //! complete normally and then steal the channel), and is not simply a drop-in
54 //! replacement. In addition, the server cannot hash/stretch the password very
55 //! much (see the note on "Augmented PAKE" below), so unless the client is
56 //! willing to perform key-stretching before running PAKE, the server's stored
57 //! verifier will be vulnerable to a low-cost dictionary attack.
61 //! Add the `spake2 dependency to your `Cargo.toml`:
68 //! and this to your crate root:
71 //! extern crate spake2;
75 //! Alice and Bob both initialize their SPAKE2 instances with the same (weak)
76 //! password. They will exchange messages to (hopefully) derive a shared secret
77 //! key. The protocol is symmetric: for each operation that Alice does, Bob will
80 //! However, there are two roles in the SPAKE2 protocol, "A" and "B". The two
81 //! sides must agree ahead of time which one will play which role (the
82 //! messages they generate depend upon which side they play). There are two
83 //! separate constructor functions, `start_a()` and `start_b()`, and a
84 //! complete interaction will use one of each (one `start_a` on one computer,
85 //! and one `start_b` on the other computer).
87 //! Each instance of a SPAKE2 protocol uses a set of shared parameters. These
88 //! include a group, a generator, and a pair of arbitrary group elements.
89 //! This library comes a single pre-generated parameter set, but could be
90 //! extended with others.
92 //! You start by calling `start_a()` (or `_b)` with the password and identity
93 //! strings for both sides. This gives you back a state object and the first
94 //! message, which you must send to your partner. Once you receive the
95 //! corresponding inbound message, you pass it into the state object
96 //! (consuming both in the process) by calling `s.finish()`, and you get back
97 //! the shared key as a bytestring.
99 //! The password and identity strings must each be wrapped in a "newtype",
100 //! which is a simple `struct` that protects against swapping the different
101 //! types of bytestrings.
103 //! Thus a client-side program start with:
106 //! use spake2::{Ed25519Group, Identity, Password, SPAKE2};
107 //! # fn send(msg: &[u8]) {}
108 //! let (s1, outbound_msg) = SPAKE2::<Ed25519Group>::start_a(
109 //! &Password::new(b"password"),
110 //! &Identity::new(b"client id string"),
111 //! &Identity::new(b"server id string"));
112 //! send(&outbound_msg);
114 //! # fn receive() -> Vec<u8> { let (s2, i2) = SPAKE2::<Ed25519Group>::start_b(&Password::new(b"password"), &Identity::new(b"client id string"), &Identity::new(b"server id string")); i2 }
115 //! let inbound_msg = receive();
116 //! let key1 = s1.finish(&inbound_msg).unwrap();
119 //! while the server-side might do:
122 //! # fn send(msg: &[u8]) {}
123 //! use spake2::{Ed25519Group, Identity, Password, SPAKE2};
124 //! let (s1, outbound_msg) = SPAKE2::<Ed25519Group>::start_b(
125 //! &Password::new(b"password"),
126 //! &Identity::new(b"client id string"),
127 //! &Identity::new(b"server id string"));
128 //! send(&outbound_msg);
130 //! # fn receive() -> Vec<u8> { let (s2, i2) = SPAKE2::<Ed25519Group>::start_a(&Password::new(b"password"), &Identity::new(b"client id string"), &Identity::new(b"server id string")); i2 }
131 //! let inbound_msg = receive();
132 //! let key2 = s1.finish(&inbound_msg).unwrap();
135 //! If both sides used the same password, and there is no man-in-the-middle,
136 //! then `key1` and `key2` will be identical. If not, the two sides will get
137 //! different keys. When one side encrypts with `key1`, and the other side
138 //! attempts to decrypt with `key2`, they'll get nothing but garbled noise.
140 //! The shared key can be used as an HMAC key to provide data integrity on
141 //! subsequent messages, or as an authenticated-encryption key (e.g.
142 //! nacl.secretbox). It can also be fed into [HKDF] [1] to derive other
143 //! session keys as necessary.
145 //! The `SPAKE2` instances, and the messages they create, are single-use. Create
146 //! a new one for each new session. `finish` consumes the instance.
148 //! # Symmetric Usage
150 //! A single SPAKE2 instance must be used asymmetrically: the two sides must
151 //! somehow decide (ahead of time) which role they will each play. The
152 //! implementation includes the side identifier in the exchanged message to
153 //! guard against a `start_a` talking to another `start_a`. Typically a
154 //! "client" will take on the `A` role, and the "server" will be `B`.
156 //! This is a nuisance for more egalitarian protocols, where there's no clear
157 //! way to assign these roles ahead of time. In this case, use
158 //! `start_symmetric()` on both sides. This uses a different set of
159 //! parameters (so it is not interoperable with `start_A` or `start_b`), but
160 //! should otherwise behave the same way. The symmetric mode uses only one
161 //! identity string, not two.
166 //! # fn send(msg: &[u8]) {}
167 //! use spake2::{Ed25519Group, Identity, Password, SPAKE2};
168 //! let (s1, outbound_msg) = SPAKE2::<Ed25519Group>::start_symmetric(
169 //! &Password::new(b"password"),
170 //! &Identity::new(b"shared id string"));
171 //! send(&outbound_msg);
173 //! # fn receive() -> Vec<u8> { let (s2, i2) = SPAKE2::<Ed25519Group>::start_symmetric(&Password::new(b"password"), &Identity::new(b"shared id string")); i2 }
174 //! let inbound_msg = receive();
175 //! let key1 = s1.finish(&inbound_msg).unwrap();
178 //! Dave does exactly the same:
181 //! # fn send(msg: &[u8]) {}
182 //! use spake2::{Ed25519Group, Identity, Password, SPAKE2};
183 //! let (s1, outbound_msg) = SPAKE2::<Ed25519Group>::start_symmetric(
184 //! &Password::new(b"password"),
185 //! &Identity::new(b"shared id string"));
186 //! send(&outbound_msg);
188 //! # fn receive() -> Vec<u8> { let (s2, i2) = SPAKE2::<Ed25519Group>::start_symmetric(&Password::new(b"password"), &Identity::new(b"shared id string")); i2 }
189 //! let inbound_msg = receive();
190 //! let key1 = s1.finish(&inbound_msg).unwrap();
193 //! # Identifier Strings
195 //! The SPAKE2 protocol includes a pair of "identity strings" `idA` and `idB`
196 //! that are included in the final key-derivation hash. This binds the key to a
197 //! single pair of parties, or for some specific purpose.
199 //! For example, when user "alice" logs into "example.com", both sides should set
200 //! `idA = b"alice"` and `idB = b"example.com"`. This prevents an attacker from
201 //! substituting messages from unrelated login sessions (other users on the same
202 //! server, or other servers for the same user).
204 //! This also makes sure the session is established with the correct service. If
205 //! Alice has one password for "example.com" but uses it for both login and
206 //! file-transfer services, `idB` should be different for the two services.
207 //! Otherwise if Alice is simultaneously connecting to both services, and
208 //! attacker could rearrange the messages and cause her login client to connect
209 //! to the file-transfer server, and vice versa.
211 //! `idA` and `idB` must be bytestrings (slices of `<u8>`).
213 //! `start_symmetric` uses a single `idSymmetric=` string, instead of `idA`
214 //! and `idB`. Both sides must provide the same `idSymmetric=`, or leave it
219 //! Sometimes, you can't hold the SPAKE2 instance in memory for the whole
220 //! negotiation: perhaps all your program state is stored in a database, and
221 //! nothing lives in RAM for more than a few moments.
223 //! Unfortunately the Rust implementation does not yet provide serialization
224 //! of the state object. A future version should correct this.
228 //! This library is probably not constant-time, and does not protect against
229 //! timing attacks. Do not allow attackers to measure how long it takes you
230 //! to create or respond to a message. This matters somewhat less for pairing
231 //! protocols, because their passwords are single-use randomly-generated
232 //! keys, so an attacker has much less to work with.
234 //! This library depends upon a strong source of random numbers. Do not use it on
235 //! a system where os.urandom() is weak.
239 //! To run the built-in speed tests, just run `cargo bench`.
241 //! SPAKE2 consists of two phases, separated by a single message exchange.
242 //! The time these phases take is split roughly 50/50. On my 2.8GHz Core-i7
243 //! (i7-7600U) cpu, the built-in Ed25519Group parameters take about 112
244 //! microseconds for each phase, and the message exchanged is 33 bytes long.
248 //! Run `cargo test` to run the built-in test suite.
252 //! The protocol was described as "PAKE2" in ["cryptobook"] [2] from Dan Boneh
253 //! and Victor Shoup. This is a form of "SPAKE2", defined by Abdalla and
254 //! Pointcheval at [RSA 2005] [3]. Additional recommendations for groups and
255 //! distinguished elements were published in [Ladd's IETF draft] [4].
257 //! The Ed25519 implementation uses code adapted from Daniel Bernstein (djb),
258 //! Matthew Dempsky, Daniel Holth, Ron Garret, with further optimizations by
259 //! Brian Warner[5]. The "arbitrary element" computation, which must be the same
260 //! for both participants, is from python-pure25519 version 0.5.
262 //! The Boneh/Shoup chapter that defines PAKE2 also defines an augmented variant
263 //! named "PAKE2+", which changes one side (typically a server) to record a
264 //! derivative of the password instead of the actual password. In PAKE2+, a
265 //! server compromise does not immediately give access to the passwords: instead,
266 //! the attacker must perform an offline dictionary attack against the stolen
267 //! data before they can learn the passwords. PAKE2+ support is planned, but not
270 //! The security of the symmetric case was proved by Kobara/Imai[6] in 2003, and
271 //! uses different (slightly weaker?) reductions than that of the asymmetric
272 //! form. See also Mike Hamburg's analysis[7] from 2015.
274 //! Brian Warner first wrote the Python version in July 2010. He wrote this
275 //! Rust version in in May 2017.
279 //! [1]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869 "HKDF"
280 //! [2]: http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/cryptobook/ "cryptobook"
281 //! [3]: http://www.di.ens.fr/~pointche/Documents/Papers/2005_rsa.pdf "RSA 2005"
282 //! [4]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ladd-spake2-01 "Ladd's IETF draft"
283 //! [5]: https://github.com/warner/python-pure25519
284 //! [6]: http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/038.pdf "Pretty-Simple Password-Authenticated Key-Exchange Under Standard Assumptions"
285 //! [7]: https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/curves/2015/000419.html "PAKE questions"
287 #![doc(html_logo_url = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/RustCrypto/meta/master/logo_small.png")]
289 #![forbid(unsafe_code)]
291 extern crate curve25519_dalek;
294 extern crate num_bigint;
298 use curve25519_dalek::constants::ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT;
299 use curve25519_dalek::edwards::CompressedEdwardsY;
300 use curve25519_dalek::edwards::EdwardsPoint as c2_Element;
301 use curve25519_dalek::scalar::Scalar as c2_Scalar;
304 use rand::{CryptoRng, OsRng, Rng};
305 use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
309 /* "newtype pattern": it's a Vec<u8>, but only used for a specific argument
310 * type, to distinguish between ones that are meant as passwords, and ones
311 * that are meant as identity strings */
313 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone)]
314 pub struct Password(Vec<u8>);
316 pub fn new(p: &[u8]) -> Password {
320 impl Deref for Password {
321 type Target = Vec<u8>;
322 fn deref(&self) -> &Vec<u8> {
327 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone)]
328 pub struct Identity(Vec<u8>);
329 impl Deref for Identity {
330 type Target = Vec<u8>;
331 fn deref(&self) -> &Vec<u8> {
336 pub fn new(p: &[u8]) -> Identity {
341 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
348 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
349 pub struct SPAKEErr {
356 //type Element: Add<Output=Self::Element>
357 // + Mul<Self::Scalar, Output=Self::Element>;
358 // const element_length: usize; // in unstable, or u8
359 //type ElementBytes : Index<usize, Output=u8>+IndexMut<usize>; // later
361 fn const_m() -> Self::Element;
362 fn const_n() -> Self::Element;
363 fn const_s() -> Self::Element;
364 fn hash_to_scalar(s: &[u8]) -> Self::Scalar;
365 fn random_scalar<T>(cspring: &mut T) -> Self::Scalar
368 fn scalar_neg(s: &Self::Scalar) -> Self::Scalar;
369 fn element_to_bytes(e: &Self::Element) -> Vec<u8>;
370 fn bytes_to_element(b: &[u8]) -> Option<Self::Element>;
371 fn element_length() -> usize;
372 fn basepoint_mult(s: &Self::Scalar) -> Self::Element;
373 fn scalarmult(e: &Self::Element, s: &Self::Scalar) -> Self::Element;
374 fn add(a: &Self::Element, b: &Self::Element) -> Self::Element;
377 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
378 pub struct Ed25519Group;
380 impl Group for Ed25519Group {
381 type Scalar = c2_Scalar;
382 type Element = c2_Element;
383 //type ElementBytes = Vec<u8>;
384 //type ElementBytes = [u8; 32];
386 type TranscriptHash = Sha256;
388 fn const_m() -> c2_Element {
389 // python -c "import binascii, spake2; b=binascii.hexlify(spake2.ParamsEd25519.M.to_bytes()); print(', '.join(['0x'+b[i:i+2] for i in range(0,len(b),2)]))"
390 // 15cfd18e385952982b6a8f8c7854963b58e34388c8e6dae891db756481a02312
392 0x15, 0xcf, 0xd1, 0x8e, 0x38, 0x59, 0x52, 0x98, 0x2b, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x8c, 0x78, 0x54,
393 0x96, 0x3b, 0x58, 0xe3, 0x43, 0x88, 0xc8, 0xe6, 0xda, 0xe8, 0x91, 0xdb, 0x75, 0x64,
394 0x81, 0xa0, 0x23, 0x12,
399 fn const_n() -> c2_Element {
400 // python -c "import binascii, spake2; b=binascii.hexlify(spake2.ParamsEd25519.N.to_bytes()); print(', '.join(['0x'+b[i:i+2] for i in range(0,len(b),2)]))"
401 // f04f2e7eb734b2a8f8b472eaf9c3c632576ac64aea650b496a8a20ff00e583c3
403 0xf0, 0x4f, 0x2e, 0x7e, 0xb7, 0x34, 0xb2, 0xa8, 0xf8, 0xb4, 0x72, 0xea, 0xf9, 0xc3,
404 0xc6, 0x32, 0x57, 0x6a, 0xc6, 0x4a, 0xea, 0x65, 0x0b, 0x49, 0x6a, 0x8a, 0x20, 0xff,
405 0x00, 0xe5, 0x83, 0xc3,
410 fn const_s() -> c2_Element {
411 // python -c "import binascii, spake2; b=binascii.hexlify(spake2.ParamsEd25519.S.to_bytes()); print(', '.join(['0x'+b[i:i+2] for i in range(0,len(b),2)]))"
412 // 6f00dae87c1be1a73b5922ef431cd8f57879569c222d22b1cd71e8546ab8e6f1
414 0x6f, 0x00, 0xda, 0xe8, 0x7c, 0x1b, 0xe1, 0xa7, 0x3b, 0x59, 0x22, 0xef, 0x43, 0x1c,
415 0xd8, 0xf5, 0x78, 0x79, 0x56, 0x9c, 0x22, 0x2d, 0x22, 0xb1, 0xcd, 0x71, 0xe8, 0x54,
416 0x6a, 0xb8, 0xe6, 0xf1,
421 fn hash_to_scalar(s: &[u8]) -> c2_Scalar {
422 ed25519_hash_to_scalar(s)
424 fn random_scalar<T>(cspring: &mut T) -> c2_Scalar
428 c2_Scalar::random(cspring)
430 fn scalar_neg(s: &c2_Scalar) -> c2_Scalar {
433 fn element_to_bytes(s: &c2_Element) -> Vec<u8> {
434 s.compress().as_bytes().to_vec()
436 fn element_length() -> usize {
439 fn bytes_to_element(b: &[u8]) -> Option<c2_Element> {
443 //let mut bytes: [u8; 32] =
444 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
445 bytes.copy_from_slice(b);
446 let cey = CompressedEdwardsY(bytes);
447 // CompressedEdwardsY::new(b)
451 fn basepoint_mult(s: &c2_Scalar) -> c2_Element {
452 //c2_Element::basepoint_mult(s)
453 ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT * s
455 fn scalarmult(e: &c2_Element, s: &c2_Scalar) -> c2_Element {
459 fn add(a: &c2_Element, b: &c2_Element) -> c2_Element {
465 fn ed25519_hash_to_scalar(s: &[u8]) -> c2_Scalar {
466 //c2_Scalar::hash_from_bytes::<Sha512>(&s)
468 // h = HKDF(salt=b"", ikm=s, hash=SHA256, info=b"SPAKE2 pw", len=32+16)
472 let mut okm = [0u8; 32 + 16];
473 Hkdf::<Sha256>::extract(Some(b""), s)
474 .expand(b"SPAKE2 pw", &mut okm)
476 //println!("expanded: {}{}", "................................", okm.iter().to_hex()); // ok
478 let mut reducible = [0u8; 64]; // little-endian
479 for (i, x) in okm.iter().enumerate().take(32 + 16) {
480 reducible[32 + 16 - 1 - i] = *x;
482 //println!("reducible: {}", reducible.iter().to_hex());
483 c2_Scalar::from_bytes_mod_order_wide(&reducible)
484 //let reduced = c2_Scalar::reduce(&reducible);
485 //println!("reduced: {}", reduced.as_bytes().to_hex());
498 assert_eq!(first_msg.len(), 32);
499 assert_eq!(second_msg.len(), 32);
500 // the transcript is fixed-length, made up of 6 32-byte values:
501 // byte 0-31 : sha256(pw)
502 // byte 32-63 : sha256(idA)
503 // byte 64-95 : sha256(idB)
504 // byte 96-127 : X_msg
505 // byte 128-159: Y_msg
506 // byte 160-191: K_bytes
507 let mut transcript = [0u8; 6 * 32];
509 let mut pw_hash = Sha256::new();
510 pw_hash.input(password_vec);
511 transcript[0..32].copy_from_slice(&pw_hash.result());
513 let mut ida_hash = Sha256::new();
514 ida_hash.input(id_a);
515 transcript[32..64].copy_from_slice(&ida_hash.result());
517 let mut idb_hash = Sha256::new();
518 idb_hash.input(id_b);
519 transcript[64..96].copy_from_slice(&idb_hash.result());
521 transcript[96..128].copy_from_slice(first_msg);
522 transcript[128..160].copy_from_slice(second_msg);
523 transcript[160..192].copy_from_slice(key_bytes);
525 //println!("transcript: {:?}", transcript.iter().to_hex());
527 //let mut hash = G::TranscriptHash::default();
528 let mut hash = Sha256::new();
529 hash.input(transcript.to_vec());
530 hash.result().to_vec()
533 fn ed25519_hash_symmetric(
540 assert_eq!(msg_u.len(), 32);
541 assert_eq!(msg_v.len(), 32);
542 // # since we don't know which side is which, we must sort the messages
543 // first_msg, second_msg = sorted([msg1, msg2])
544 // transcript = b"".join([sha256(pw).digest(),
545 // sha256(idSymmetric).digest(),
546 // first_msg, second_msg, K_bytes])
548 // the transcript is fixed-length, made up of 5 32-byte values:
549 // byte 0-31 : sha256(pw)
550 // byte 32-63 : sha256(idSymmetric)
551 // byte 64-95 : X_msg
552 // byte 96-127 : Y_msg
553 // byte 128-159: K_bytes
554 let mut transcript = [0u8; 5 * 32];
556 let mut pw_hash = Sha256::new();
557 pw_hash.input(password_vec);
558 transcript[0..32].copy_from_slice(&pw_hash.result());
560 let mut ids_hash = Sha256::new();
561 ids_hash.input(id_s);
562 transcript[32..64].copy_from_slice(&ids_hash.result());
565 transcript[64..96].copy_from_slice(msg_u);
566 transcript[96..128].copy_from_slice(msg_v);
568 transcript[64..96].copy_from_slice(msg_v);
569 transcript[96..128].copy_from_slice(msg_u);
571 transcript[128..160].copy_from_slice(key_bytes);
573 let mut hash = Sha256::new();
574 hash.input(transcript.to_vec());
575 hash.result().to_vec()
578 /* "session type pattern" */
580 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
587 // we implement a custom Debug below, to avoid revealing secrets in a dump
588 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
589 pub struct SPAKE2<G: Group> {
590 //where &G::Scalar: Neg {
592 xy_scalar: G::Scalar,
593 password_vec: Vec<u8>,
598 password_scalar: G::Scalar,
601 impl<G: Group> SPAKE2<G> {
608 xy_scalar: G::Scalar,
609 ) -> (SPAKE2<G>, Vec<u8>) {
610 //let password_scalar: G::Scalar = hash_to_scalar::<G::Scalar>(password);
611 let password_scalar: G::Scalar = G::hash_to_scalar(&password);
615 // sym: X = B*x * S*pw
616 let blinding = match side {
617 Side::A => G::const_m(),
618 Side::B => G::const_n(),
619 Side::Symmetric => G::const_s(),
621 let m1: G::Element = G::add(
622 &G::basepoint_mult(&xy_scalar),
623 &G::scalarmult(&blinding, &password_scalar),
625 //let m1: G::Element = &G::basepoint_mult(&x) + &(blinding * &password_scalar);
626 let msg1: Vec<u8> = G::element_to_bytes(&m1);
627 let mut password_vec = Vec::new();
628 password_vec.extend_from_slice(&password);
629 let mut id_a_copy = Vec::new();
630 id_a_copy.extend_from_slice(&id_a);
631 let mut id_b_copy = Vec::new();
632 id_b_copy.extend_from_slice(&id_b);
633 let mut id_s_copy = Vec::new();
634 id_s_copy.extend_from_slice(&id_s);
636 let mut msg_and_side = Vec::new();
637 msg_and_side.push(match side {
638 Side::A => 0x41, // 'A'
639 Side::B => 0x42, // 'B'
640 Side::Symmetric => 0x53, // 'S'
642 msg_and_side.extend_from_slice(&msg1);
648 password_vec, // string
653 password_scalar, // scalar
663 xy_scalar: G::Scalar,
664 ) -> (SPAKE2<G>, Vec<u8>) {
665 Self::start_internal(
679 xy_scalar: G::Scalar,
680 ) -> (SPAKE2<G>, Vec<u8>) {
681 Self::start_internal(
691 fn start_symmetric_internal(
694 xy_scalar: G::Scalar,
695 ) -> (SPAKE2<G>, Vec<u8>) {
696 Self::start_internal(
706 pub fn start_a(password: &Password, id_a: &Identity, id_b: &Identity) -> (SPAKE2<G>, Vec<u8>) {
707 let mut cspring: OsRng = OsRng::new().unwrap();
708 let xy_scalar: G::Scalar = G::random_scalar(&mut cspring);
709 Self::start_a_internal(&password, &id_a, &id_b, xy_scalar)
712 pub fn start_b(password: &Password, id_a: &Identity, id_b: &Identity) -> (SPAKE2<G>, Vec<u8>) {
713 let mut cspring: OsRng = OsRng::new().unwrap();
714 let xy_scalar: G::Scalar = G::random_scalar(&mut cspring);
715 Self::start_b_internal(&password, &id_a, &id_b, xy_scalar)
718 pub fn start_symmetric(password: &Password, id_s: &Identity) -> (SPAKE2<G>, Vec<u8>) {
719 let mut cspring: OsRng = OsRng::new().unwrap();
720 let xy_scalar: G::Scalar = G::random_scalar(&mut cspring);
721 Self::start_symmetric_internal(&password, &id_s, xy_scalar)
724 pub fn finish(self, msg2: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SPAKEErr> {
725 if msg2.len() != 1 + G::element_length() {
726 return Err(SPAKEErr {
727 kind: ErrorType::WrongLength,
730 let msg_side = msg2[0];
733 Side::A => match msg_side {
736 return Err(SPAKEErr {
737 kind: ErrorType::BadSide,
741 Side::B => match msg_side {
744 return Err(SPAKEErr {
745 kind: ErrorType::BadSide,
749 Side::Symmetric => match msg_side {
752 return Err(SPAKEErr {
753 kind: ErrorType::BadSide,
759 let msg2_element = match G::bytes_to_element(&msg2[1..]) {
762 return Err(SPAKEErr {
763 kind: ErrorType::CorruptMessage,
768 // a: K = (Y+N*(-pw))*x
769 // b: K = (X+M*(-pw))*y
770 let unblinding = match self.side {
771 Side::A => G::const_n(),
772 Side::B => G::const_m(),
773 Side::Symmetric => G::const_s(),
775 let tmp1 = G::scalarmult(&unblinding, &G::scalar_neg(&self.password_scalar));
776 let tmp2 = G::add(&msg2_element, &tmp1);
777 let key_element = G::scalarmult(&tmp2, &self.xy_scalar);
778 let key_bytes = G::element_to_bytes(&key_element);
780 // key = H(H(pw) + H(idA) + H(idB) + X + Y + K)
781 //transcript = b"".join([sha256(pw).digest(),
782 // sha256(idA).digest(), sha256(idB).digest(),
783 // X_msg, Y_msg, K_bytes])
784 //key = sha256(transcript).digest()
785 // note that both sides must use the same order
788 Side::A => ed25519_hash_ab(
792 self.msg1.as_slice(),
796 Side::B => ed25519_hash_ab(
801 self.msg1.as_slice(),
804 Side::Symmetric => ed25519_hash_symmetric(
815 fn maybe_utf8(s: &[u8]) -> String {
816 match String::from_utf8(s.to_vec()) {
817 Ok(m) => format!("(s={})", m),
818 Err(_) => format!("(hex={})", hex::encode(s)),
822 impl<G: Group> fmt::Debug for SPAKE2<G> {
823 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
826 "SPAKE2(G=?, side={:?}, idA={}, idB={}, idS={})",
828 maybe_utf8(&self.id_a),
829 maybe_utf8(&self.id_b),
830 maybe_utf8(&self.id_s)